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Introduction 
Partitioned Histories, Divided Identities 
' 
n the summer of 1951, Laila Ahmed returned to Calcutta, the city 
of her birth. Before the Partition of India in 194 7, she had ~arried 
Lt Hyat Rizvi, a naval officer in the Royal Indian Navy, and hke any 
dutiful wife had followed her husband to Karachi when he decided to 
opt for service in Pakistan.1 However, domestic difficulties and marital 
discord forced her to return home and she filed for divorce in August 
1951 at the Calcutta High Court. Laila's story should have ended with 
the dissolution of her marriage. Instead, it became entangled in the 
processes of establishing the new nations of India and Pakistan in the 
aftermath of the Partition. Her move from one country to another and 
her subsequent return raised questions about her rightful domicile, 
national identity, and citizenship. 
In the absence of any rules and regulations that defined Indian 
citizenship legally, Laila's status within India was guided by the 
Succession Act of 19252 which dictated that the domicile of the 
wife followed that of her husband. Indian officials in Calcutta thus 
determined that Laila Ahmed had Pakistani domicile until the last date 
of her marriage and had, by virtue of living with her husband until 
that date, become a Pakistani citizen. However, they argued that with 
the dissolution of her marriage, she did not automatically regain her 
Indian citizenship. She had to re-acquire this nationality. The matter 
was further complicated by the fact that until the Indian Citizenship 
Act was passed in 1955, the official policy in India dictated: 'no one 
can acquire Indian nationality except by birth or marriage'.3 Laila was 
thus in identity limbo, one of a growing number of people without 
nations who were unsure whether they were citizens of India or 
Introduction 3 
Pakistan, because of the ambiguities associated with what determined 
such citizenship. 
The processes of establishing new national orders in the aftermath 
of the Partition entailed that minorities-Hindus in Pakistan and 
Muslims in India-had to renegotiate their identities as rightful citizens. 
This book focuses on minorities such as Laila and examines issues of 
territoriality, identity, migration, citizenship, and the subsequent 
reordering of national identities in India and East Pakistan (present-
day Bangladesh). The narrative begins in 194 7 with the Partition, 
and ends with the second Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, by which time 
citizens of each country had to make their permanent domicile in 
one or the other country. 
There were three pa11itions in 1947-of British India and of the 
provinces of Bengal and Punjab-that created the new nation-states of 
India and a spatially fragmented West and East Pakistan. It engendered 
the largest recorded population transfer in history amidst horrific mass 
violence. Between 1946 and 1965, nearly 9 million I !indus and Sikhs 
moved into India and approximately 5 million Muslims moved to 
both parts of Pakistan.4 Partition as the twin facet of freedom remains 
an apocalyptic event within the South Asian popular imagination, 
reinforced by family and personal memories of violence, exile, 
movement, and resettlement. 
Bengal's Pa11ition, which is the focus of this book, entailed that 
approximately two-thirds of its area was carved out to create East 
Pakistan. It produced the longest international border between two 
countries in South Asia and mill ions of new citizens who were marked 
as majorities and minorities based on religious demography. Unlike 
the Punjab division, with its large-scale horrific violence and swift 
exchange of minority populations, the Bengal Partition witnessed 
protracted migration of Hindu and Muslim minorities engendered 
partly by routine small-scale violence and partly by the new states' 
attempts to decide the fate of their respective minority populations. It 
meant that it took almost two decades after the Partition of India and 
Pakistan to map and delineate their territories, determine who could 
and could not be their citizens, and implement laws which would 
constitute the national identities of their respective citizens. A focus 
on the longue duree of Partition's impact not only allows us to better 
realize the impe1fect and unfinished nature of post-Partition initiatives 
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by the new States of 1 ndia and Pakistan, but also to put in historical 
context, the actions of ordina1y men and women living during these 
extraordinary times. 
Rather than framing I 94 7 as the 'break' between colonial and 
post-colonial histories of South Asia, or as the year that marked the 
'moment of arrival', 5 this book joins new histories of the Partition/' 
which sees it as a process rather than a single event, thereby unsettling 
time and region-bound nationalized histories. Partition continued to 
influence and modify State policies and people's lives beyond 1947. 
rurther, the book uses a cross border analysis to show that rather than 
dissociating from each other after 194 7, both India and East Pakistan 
were intricately linked in their projects to establish respective post-
Partition national orders. 
Two specific understandings about their new citizens in divided 
Bengal informed most official policies of the Indian and East 
Pakistani states. First, they continued to operate within colonial 
understandings of community identity as primarily a function of 
religion. Thus, state policies ossified religious affiliation and viewed 
their citizenry as either a member of the majority and minority 
communities. Second, both states perceived of a specific paradigm of 
Partition violence, which viewed the large-scale and cataclysmic riots 
in Punjilb of 194 7-8 as standard, informed, and influenced policies 
with regard to both minority nationals and refugees. Since the 
small-scale ilnd chronic nature of violence in post-Partition Bengal 
remained outside this paradigm, the Bengal Partition became, in the 
eyes of the post-colonial states, a site of illegitimate victim hood ilnd 
unwarranted migration. 
In post-Partition Bengal, the discourse over citizenship animated 
the project of 'nationalizing the nation'.? Who were the rightful 
citizens of the new nations and how could such claims be justified? 
Did minorities, the Hindus in East Pakistan and the Muslims in 
India, by crossing the international border become refugees and have 
automatic rights to demand citizenship? I ilfgue that the new niltion 
states or their minorities did not assume such identities and issues of 
citizenship. Rather, they were produced categories, debated within the 
hallowed halls of officialdom in Delhi, Calcutta, and Dacca, and given 
legal sanction through ordinances and laws debated and passed by 
parliamentary and state legislations. 
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Defining categories of identity such as evacuees, refugees, displaced 
persons, aliens, and infiltrators was a major element of the process 
of establishing post-Partition national orders and turning colonial 
subjects into national citizens. Further, these identities were produced 
discursively, mediated through the actions of officials located at the 
periphery of the nation, especially at the borders and diplomatic 
missions. Refugee documents, border slips, and passports became the 
means through which the Indian State sought to differentiate between 
refugees, migrants, aliens, and citizens. Legislations surrounding 
the rights to own and transfer property became intrinsic within the 
renegotiations of nationality in East Pakistan. Implicit within these 
redefinitions were the attempts of each state to establish a minority 
citizen's loyalty to the state. The determination of such loyalty was 
susceptible to contingent political, social, and economic contexts and 
was predicated on successful negotiations between minorities and the 
nation states. 
While Indian and East Pakistani state policies contributed 
substantially in constituting new identities in divided Bengal, minority 
citizens were by no means passive bystanders to such top-down 
processes. Rather, as the book shows, minority citizens-Hindus in 
East Pakistan and Muslims in West Bengal-repeatedly contested 
official attempts to define national territory and identity through their 
persistent movement across the border, protests against requisition of 
houses, rallies to demand rehabilitation, and continuation of family 
ties across the border. Moreover, it was the everyday interactions 
between majority and minority communities, now predicated on new 
ideas of belonging and nationality, that produced a protracted state 
of uncertainty and fear amongst the latter, and continued to influence 
contingent decisions to move from one's home and to become evacuees 
or refugees in another country. 
PARTITION AND ITS PRE-HISTORIES 
The extensive scholarship on the Partition is problematic in several 
crucial aspects. The Partition serves as a template for the reinvention 
of national histories within India and Pakistan. In these national 
narratives, Partition is represented as the momentous culmination 
of an anti-colonial national struggle that acceded to the division for 
the sake of a larger Indian unity, or as a unilinear movement towards 
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national self-representations of distinct communities. Paradoxically, 
while Partition persists as the defining moment for those engaged in 
reinterpreting cultural and national identities in contempormy South 
Asia, Partition historiography remains trapped within a teleological 
and chronological barrier of 194 7 . This axiomatic end date for 
historical enquiry has led to the creation of 'pre-histories' of the 
PartitionH-to an obsessive focus on the high politics that preceded 
the event in an attempt to explain wily it happened" and to assign 
'responsibility' 10 either to the negotiations between the British and 
the major Indian political parties-the Indian National Congress and 
the Muslim League-or to the actions of leading political figures such 
as Lord Mountbatten, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and 
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. 11 The contradictions inherent within anti-
colonial nationalism, between nation, religion, and group identity, 
were sought to be resolved through the construction of Muslim 
separatism or 'communalism' as the evil doppelganger of 'secular' 
nationalism. 
In the late 1980s, historical enquiry on the Partition shifted its 
focus from the national to the provincial arena. 12 However, the 
historiographical focus remained firmly directed at the level of 
provincial high politics. In the case of Bengal, such enquiry involved 
a reassessment of provincial identity politics in the 1940s vis-a-vis 
national politics. The political dissensions between the all-India 
platforms of the Congress and the League and their provincial 
counterparts are now well documented l.l as scholars focused on 
different points within Bengali politics that marked the decisive turn 
away from anti-colonial nationalism towards the path to separatism 
or communalism.14 
One of the paradigmatic problems that has haunted the 
historiography of the Partition is this communal-national binary 
that seeks to explain communalism as the causal force that, at 
the expense of nationalism, marked the inevitable path towards 
Partition. 15 In the case of Bengal, one of the main proponents of the 
communalism- nationalism bina1y is Joya Chatterji, who explains the 
Bengal Partition as an event that Hindu communalism engendered. 
She argues that the public demands for a separate 'homeland for 
Bengali Hindus' on the eve of Partition reflected the end result of a 
decisive shift 'from nationalism to communalism' that had marked 
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Bengal politics and identity from the 1930s. 16 Chatterji attributes a 
central role to elite Bengali Hindus in spearheading the campaign that 
led to the fateful division of the province in 1947. Having identified 
the main actors in the promotion of Hindu communalism, she then 
makes the problematic leap to make the case for all Bengali Hindus 
who, in her view, were not 'passive bystanders'. 17 Chatterji's larger 
argument provides a convenient historical trajectory to this colonial 
representation and seeks to explain the religious demographic 
calculations behind the Partition as a process that reflected inherent 
divisions within the Indian socio-political milieu. Partition, thus, was 
inevitable not only because Indian leaders such as Nehru, PateL and 
Jinnah forced the British hand but also because of the intrinsic and 
age-old communal fault lines. Such arguments not only tend to deflect 
the role of British politics in India, but they also provide no space 
for the examination of alternatives to the nationalism-communalism 
binary. IS 
That provincial politics in Bengal saw an increasing presence of elite 
Hindu and Muslim communalism cannot be denied. From the 1930s 
onwards, Hindu organizations began to mobilize lower-caste groups, 
such as the Namasudras in Bengat within the larger Hindu fold. 19 The 
subsequent shifts in class and community relations were critical in 
garnering support for the Partition. Organizing the Muslim peasantry 
in Bengal along communitarian lines also involved mobilization along 
class divisions.2o These factors do not necessarily indicate that public 
discourse and political rhetoric in the 1930s and the 1940s assumed 
a Hindu or Muslim identity at the expense of anti-colonial nationalist 
agitation. Rather, nationalist leaders had strategically deployed both 
Hindu and Muslim religious symbols in their efforts to incorporate 
the masses since at least 1905. The anti-colonial nationalism of both 
Bengali Hindus and Muslims had always been influenced and informed 
by religion and religious symbols.21 However, a critical distinction 
needs to be made between the communitarian struggles of non-elite 
social groups in which religion played an important organizational 
role and the communal mobilizations within provincial politics 
informed by colonial constructions of politically representative 
religious groups.22 
Religion as the raison d'etre of the politics of Partition becomes 
problematic when the focus shifts to the eastern part of Bengal. The 
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East Bengal/East Pakistan story is subsumed within a broader schema 
of Partition historiography that fails to appreciate that for some 
Muslim Bengalis, the Partition was a way to emerge from Hindu 
domination and experience cultural autonomy as a Muslim and a 
Bengali.23 However, such explanations lead to yet another. kind of pre-
history that seeks to explain the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971 as a 
repudiation of arguments in favour of Muslim or Hindu communalism. 
Unfortunately, the narrative of Bangladeshi nationhood has not only 
erased the Partition of 1947 from public memory there, but also 
rewritten the history to locate the birth of the Mus! im Bengali 'national 
self-consciousness' from the first Partition of Bengal in 1905.24 
In recent years, academic scholarship has shifted away from the 
pre-histories of Partition to its immediate impact, from causality to 'lived 
experience',25 in order to render a human and gendered narrative of the 
Partition and its aftermath.26 Ethnographic studies focus on the period 
leading up to the Partition and its immediate repercussions on the 
experiences of the displaced and on the narratives of the horrific acts 
of rape, violence, and murder, both between and within communities 
in the Punjab. These studies have conclusively established the gendered 
nature of Partition violence as it targeted women as symbols of their 
community and family honour.27 The most important contribution of 
these writings has been to draw attention to the disjuncture between 
national histories of the Partition and the personal narratives of 194 7 
and to reveal the multiple ways in which the latter contest and subvert 
the former. Communities and local traditions reconstituted themselves 
through the language of Partition violence that privileged a particular 
reconstruction of the past.28 Collective and individual memories of 
violence are also mediated along caste, class, and gendered lines. 
Scholarly enquiry has thus shifted emphasis from the structural 
analysis of Partition violence to the analysis of modalities of memory 
and forgetting of such brutality. 
The focus is now on Partition and its impact on subcontinental 
nations, cities, and their citizens.29 Partition and its outcomes, as recent 
research shows, were products of hasty planning within high politics 
and contingent decisions of millions who attempted to make sense 
of their new status as citizens of new countries after 194 7. Rather 
than neatly marking the end of colonialism and the beginning of 
nationhood in India and Pakistan, Partition, within this scholarly shift, 
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appears as unfinished, messy, and protracted, continuing to influence 
the identities of those who were the most affected by the division. 
However, like the earlier binaries of communalism versus 
nationalism, recent scholarship has tended to examine post-colonial 
nationhood through yet another binary: secular state versus non-
secular, especially in the case of India. The focus has been on examining 
the Hindu majoritarian underpinnings of Indian secularism and the 
imperfect implementations of such ideals when it came to its citizens. 30 
Zamindar's excellent study of the aftermath of Partition in Karachi 
and Delhi falls within this category in its examination of official 
policies designed to control migration after Partition. She captures the 
uncertain status of those caught on the wrong side of the border, as they 
negotiated the documentary terrain of peimits, passports, and evacuee 
property that were instituted by both India and Pakistan to prevent 
migration and return of Muslims in Pakistan and India respectively. In 
the process, she questions both the proclaimed secular identity of the 
new Indian State as well as the assertions of the Pakistani state that it 
was the homeland of all Muslims. 31 
Zamindar's central thesis of 'governmentality' as primary in 
engendering national difference sits awkwardly when one shifts focus to 
the division in the east. In post-Partition Bengal, state legislations were 
kept to a minimum32 but efforts to control the chronic and protracted 
migration produced parallel ideas about nationality. Here, too, as 
another recent book by Joya Chattetii highlights,33 Muslim minorities 
in West Bengal were ghettoized and dispossessed as in Delhi, and 
' minorities, both Hindus and Muslims, had to juggle multiple identities 
as they crossed the border or attempted to return home. However, 
even as they became a minority, Chatterji argues, in subsequent years, 
the Muslims in West Bengal became critical to the political balance 
within the province as no political party could afford to ignore this 
significant vote bank. Similarly, Hindu refugees from East Pakistan were 
active agents who demanded rehabilitation from the Indian State as 
a matter of human right and became significant in the emergence of 
Left politics in West Bengal.34 
This book joins both Zamindar.and Chatterji in their examination 
of the impact of the Partition on those living in the divided regions. 
However, it differs from such scholarship on two crucial aspects. 
First; although it examines official policies in India and East Pakistan 
1 0 Partitioned Lives 
that were significant in defining and imposing national identities on 
minorities, this book, additionally, shows that contingent actions 
and decisions of lower-level functionaries, minorities, and refugees 
were central to how such new configurations of citizenship and 
belonging came into being. Rather than being passive victims of 
state legislations, these ordinary citizens manipulated legal clauses to 
better able to manage their status, and negotiated, complained, and 
sometimes ignored official dictates. Their ultimate migration and/ 
or dispossession in the subsequent decades of the Partition were a 
result of the combined effects of state policies and individual and 
group action contingent on the continuation of routine violence in 
the region. In this respect, this book highlights the role of Partition 
itself, rather than of regional particularities, in reconstituting national 
identities for minorities. 
Second, this book takes a cross-border perspective in its analysis of 
both official policies and individual actions. It shows that minorities, 
be it Hindus in East Pakistan or Muslims in West Bengal, faced 
similar sets of discriminatory circumstances and questions of national 
belonging. A cross-border analysis further allows to provide a counter 
to India and Pakistan's projects of nationalizing their respective citizens 
by showing that for most ordinary men and women, the border 
served utilitarian purposes rather than defining the limits of each 
nation. New citizenships were, for them, functional at best and they 
retained old ties of wealth, kinship, and local identity even after new 
nationalities had been imposed on them through the documentary 
regime of passports and visas. 
The aftermath of the Partition in Bengal presents us with several 
ways to understand the larger impact of the Partition counter to what 
have become the two normative paradigms of the Partition experience 
in South Asia. First, Partition in these analyses remains regionally 
confined in their analyses of the Punjab division.35 Second, they 
assume that for the most part, the large-scale violence engendered 
migrations and renegotiations of citizenship and belonging. Although 
violence was integral to how the Partition affected people's lives, it was 
not, as new studies have revealed, the only experience.36 
The low-scale routine violence in divided Bengal fits awkwardly 
within this effort to represent and rewrite a specific subcontinental 
partition experience. This is not to suggest that the Partition of Bengal 
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has not received any attention within academic scholarship, but such 
attention has been primarily focused on the rehabilitation of refugees 
from East Pakistan into India. 
This book argues that such differences in relief and rehabilitation 
policies stem from the understanding of violence as cataclysmic and 
physical and the attempt to define refugees as victims of such violence. 
This understanding of Partition violence, which characterized the 
Punjab experience but not the small-scale chronic violence in Bengal, 
influenced refugee rehabilitation policies of the Indian State. The 
Indian State thus considered the migration of Bengali refugees to be 
unwarranted, and consequently viewed these individuals as illegitimate 
candidates for rehabilitation. It viewed these refugees primarily as 
economic migrants rather than as victims of violence or simply as 
persecuted Hindu minorities. Thus, the book suggests a different, more 
complicated understanding of the constitution of secular ideals in the 
early years of Independence. 
The scholarship on refugee rehabilitation itself remains 
problematic, as researchers view refugees as an undifferentiated mass 
whose experiences of migration and resettlement are similar. While 
the socio-economic background of those crossing the borders were 
influential in their relocation, the timing of their migration, whether 
after 1947, or after the riots of 1950, or beyond, was critical to how 
they were viewed by the state and their subsequent rehabilitation. 
In actuality, the reconstitution of identities depended on a variety of 
factors, some of which were created in collusion with official policies 
of the new nation states.37 
This book counters such normative understandings of the aftermath 
of the Partition, by examining the impact of open borders, laissez-
faire state policies, routine violence, and continuous and protracted 
migration in the east. It argues that it was migration in the east that 
forced India and Pakistan to craft legislations such as the passport 
system that ascribed nationality to their minority citizens. However, 
the implementation of these legislations continued in a piecemeal 
fashion, and minorities in the region consistently faced questions 
of loyalty as they negotiated between their residential and national 
identity. However, they were often active agents in reshaping their 
new identities as they contingently moved back and forth across the 
border but kept open the channels of negotiation with the state for 
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their rights as citizens, evacuees, and refugees. The aftermath of the 
Partition in Bengal thus offers a better template to understand the 
protracted processes engendered in 1947. Here, the border remained 
porous even after 1952, citizenship continued to be contested even 
after the Citizenship Act of 1955, refugees still continued to come after 
1958 when the last refugee camp was shut down, and ownership of 
property was disputed between the state and who it termed as evacuees 
until 1965 when the such property became enemy property. 
NEW STATES AND THEIR CITIZENS 
Establishing 'national' states was the primary task at hand after the 
Partition for India and Pakistan. Both states deployed a range of 
symbolic, discursive, and actual methods that produced states as 
authoritative entities, which controlled the political and social life 
of each nation. In the Indian context, the 'practice of post-colonial 
nation-statism' involved visual representations, ritual practices of 
commemoration such as the Republic Day parades, discourses , on 
science and technology, and urban planning designs as ways of 
constructing the new nation-state.3B Although far apart, West and 
East Pakistan also embarked on the process of nationalizing their 
identity through the declaration of Urdu as the national language, 
creating a 'political economy of defence'39 and weighing the economy 
in favour of the West at the expense of the east. 40 In East Pakistan the 
authorities focused on new legislations affecting people and property 
in the divided provinces, the appointment of new personnel to 
implement these policies, and the investment in, and construction of, 
new infrastructure to enable the control and dispersal of state policies 
at the periphery. 
The legislations that directly impacted the partitioned regions aimed 
both at delineating the nations' boundaries and controlling access to 
its territories. More importantly, they were instrumental in categorizing 
citizens-those who belonged and those who did not. Both India and 
Pakistan instituted the permit system in 1948 and the passport and 
visa scheme in 1952 that allowed certain groups to refugees to enter 
and prevented others from returning back home.41 In addition, evacuee 
property laws in both states promised guardianship of abandoned 
properties until the time their owners returned, and requisition laws 
targeted these very properties as means to rehabilitate refugees from 
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the other side. Migration and property became nationalized: the act of 
moving from one state to another meant the relinquishing of one's 
property, indicating a sort of declaration of intent, a 'natural' inclination 
towards the other nation. Interestingly, the Permit system was not put 
in operation in the eastern sector with both governments preferring to 
keep that border open until the establishment of the Passports in 1952. 
Further, the Indian Evacuee Property Legislations did not encompass 
properties of refugees in the eastern zone. In spite of such differential 
policies, Hindus in East Pakistan and Muslims in West Bengal and 
Bihar were prone to be seen as trans-territorial citizens whose loyalty 
to their respective nations would always be suspect. 
While the focus on official policy and different legislations 
provides a window into the creation of post-Partition nations, it is 
important to examine the operational aspects of these policies. How 
did these legislations, enacted in the capital cities of Delhi, Karachi, 
and Dhaka, translate and affect the people they aimed to categorize? 
Who were responsible for their implementation? The book focuses 
on the actions of intermediaiy officials who were entrusted with 
the implementation of these laws, which sought to create strong 
and centralized post-Partition states.42 These low-level officials, 
often located at a distance from central and higher authorities, had 
substantial discretionary power in their districts and towns to interpret 
the law as they saw fit. 43 
Moreover, they were crucial in determining who could and could 
not belong to the nation. This is not to argue that these bureaucrats 
necessarily had little regard for the law and were autocratic in 
their actions. But in state-society relations, one must recognize the 
inherent flexibility of human actions. In the case of divided Bengal, 
the interactions of these low-level officials were often informed by 
economic and religious imperatives. Thus, even though official policies 
and legislations were avowedly non-discriminatory on paper, they 
often followed discriminatory paths when implemented by some of 
these officials. 
State-society relationships are further complicated when one 
looks at one of the universal and characteristic features of the 
modern nation state: its citizenship, defined primarily through the 
group membership of its citizens within a definite territorial unit. 
Territory and membership are closely related-the modern state is 
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simultaneously a territorial organization and a personal assoaauon. 
Citizenship is not a mere reflex of residence; it is an enduring personal 
status that is not generated by passing or extended residence alone and 
does not lapse with temporary or prolonged absence.45 
In the case of divided Bengal, citizenship followed a different path.. 
Migration from one territorial unit to another, even if temporary', 
defined one's nationality; it signalled the intent of acquiring a new 
citizenship and simultaneously giving up the original identity. In 
the years between the Partition and the enactment of appropriate 
legislation laying down the regulations and definitions of citizenship 
in India and Pakistan, individuals who crossed the border had to 
constantly negotiate the ambiguities surrounding their migration, 
residence, and putative and 'natural' national identity. 
The initial policy of the Government of India had been to alloW 
citizenship rights to those migrants who officially declared their 
intention to become citizens. of India and later acquired the necessary 
documentation. Getting one's name on the electoral rolls was one 
of the primary ways to ensure subsequent citizenship rights. Such a 
policy presented two contradictory dilemmas for Indian authorities. 
On the one hand, by allowing any migrant to acquire citizenship, 
it could limit its rehabilitation responsibilities towards the· refugees. 
On the other hand, the government feared that such a policy might 
encourage Hindu minorities to opt for migration in such large numbers 
that would not only create an economic strain but also threaten the 
secular fa<;ade of the Indian State. In order to stem the continuing 
tide of migration, the Indian government fixed a time limit by which 
a refugee/migrant had to declare his/her intention to stay in India,46 
and in the early 1950s, declared that inclusiOn within the electoral 
rolls would not guarantee automatic citizenship rights. 
No easy coincidence between citizenship, religious identity, and 
the territorial limits of the nation existed. The demand for a Muslim 
homeland that had pervaded the countdown to Partition, and its 
tangible success embedded within the establishment of Pakistan, 
meant that there was an implicit understanding that Muslims would 
'naturally' identify with Pakistan, while non-Muslims-Hindus, 
Buddhists, Christians, and others--would automatically become 
part of India. Consequently, minority Hindus and Muslims who 
continued living in Pakistan and India after 1947 became what Willem 
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Van Schendel defines as 'proxy citizens'.47 Minority Hindus in East 
Pakistan, though legally citizens of the Pakistan state, were categorized 
as putative citizens of the Indian State which endeavoured to ensure 
their rights and security through agreements and the establishment 
of institutions such as minority boards. Similarly, newspapers in East 
Pakistan consistently highlighted the plight of the Muslims in India. 
Such trans-territorial concerns were integral to the project of nation 
building even as they belied the limits of distinct nationhood and 
contradicted the project of secular identities. 
For each newly independent state, the security of the minorities 
within India and East Pakistan became the acid test of legitimate 
nationhood. Minority migration became central to the game of 
numerical one-upmanship between India and Pakistan, as each 
accused the other of creating conditions that stimulated the protracted 
migration on the eastern border. Both countries evolved processes that 
sought to quantify the human movement across their mutual border. 
At one level, the direction and magnitude of the migration indicated 
the successes and failures of India and East Pakistan to establish 
their national order. In this game, India claimed a moral edge as the 
Census of 1951 recorded that more Hindus had migrated there from 
East Pakistan than did Muslim migrants leave India for East Pakistan. 
India blamed East Pakistan for not guaranteeing minority right and 
the latter countered by accusing India of creating 'pull factors' for 
the East Pakistan Hindus, which went counter to its proclaimed 
secular identity. Implicit within such accusations was the question 
of legitimacy predicated on each state's ability to guarantee equal 
citizenship rights to their respective minorities. 
For the East Pakistani authorities, migration of its minorities 
reflected an intricate weave of loyalty and territory that defined 
citizenship not by birth but by domicile. Thus, any movement across 
the border was interpreted as inherently disloyal, destabilizing the new 
state and siphoning its minimal resources. The very real predicament 
of establishing the infrastructure for the new East Pakistani state 
was a potent factor within this equation. In 1948, the East Pakistan 
state legislated the Evacuee Property Act to assure its minorities that 
authorities would guard their property and hand it back to them if 
they returned from India. But by the time of Indo-Pakistan war of 
1965, the East Pakistan government changed this legislation, pleading 
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wartime exigencies that led to the Enemy Property Act of 1965. As 
the name suggests, this law usurped the very property that it had, 
in the earlier decade, claimed to protect. The historical trajectory of 
this metamorphosis highlights the critical connections between state 
processes and minority dislocation in post-Partition Bengal. 
The chronic and prolonged nature of the migration from the east 
illustrates that even as minorities in West Bengal and East Pakistan 
developed into trans-territorial citizens in the eyes of each state, such 
identities remained negotiable at the individual level. Hindu and 
Muslim minorities identified with the state of their co-religionists only 
under extreme circumstances when they perceived that their territorial 
nation could not guarantee their citizenship rights in the face of threats 
from extra-state actors. Thus, for East Pakistani Hindus, migration was 
not always predicated on permanent uprooting but on the belief that 
they would be able to retain their kinship and social ties with their 
ancestral homes. They were also following the traditional pattern of 
urban-rural migration that took place in the region during colonial 
times. In the past, there had been the possibility of return. However, 
the requirements of post-Partition states to define their boundaries 
and identify their loyal citizens made it almost impossible for the 
continuance of such ties. Similarly, within the communally charged 
environment of India's relations with the princely states of Kashmir 
and Hyderabad in 1947-8, the issue of loyalty became controversial 
for the minority Muslims of West Bengal. As members of a community 
that had been closely connected with the demand for Pakistan, they 
easily became the usual suspects in regard to anti-state activities. The 
Bengal Partition, thus, generated a unique form of trans-territoriality 
where national citizenship was defined by domicile, but religious 
community defined proxy citizenship. This duality reinforced the 
marginality of minorities as loyal citizens of their territorial nation. 
THE NATION'S BORDERLANDS 
The establishment of international borders was the sine qua non of the 
Partition enterprise. The impossible task of determining a border in six 
weeks to accommodate religious demography was delegated to Cyril 
Radcliffe. a British civil servant with little knowledge of the Indian 
subcontinent. Radcliffe was the chairman of the five-member Boundary 
Commission which was hampered by unclear and contradictory terms 
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of reference.~~ The conflicting claims of the leading political parties 
and a restricted schedule of six weeks made their task more difficult. 
Although maps are essential tools of knowledge and control, 
defining not only topography but also the conceptual nation; 19 the 
new borders and their creation in 1947 have since been peripheral 
both within political discourses on nation building and, until recently, 
within scholarly accounts. Ironically, within post-1947 South Asia, 
accur.lte maps were largely non-existent because India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh restricted and continue to restrict public access to maps 
under claims of national security. Such cartographic anxieties, whose 
underlying fear is that of national disintegration, are clearly a legacy 
of the Partition. Despite such difficulties, recent studies have managed 
to elaborate on the uncertainty and confusion that were fundamental 
to the establishment of the line of divisionso Expediency rather 
than accuracy guided British decolonization efforts in 194 7. Thus, 
the accuracy of colonial maps and the basic realities of the ultimate 
border mattered less than the fa<;ade that the Hounda1y Commission 
had deliberated and resolved issues along democratic principles."' The 
process of creating the border encompassed both the desire for an 
honourable withdrawal on the part of the British and the first steps 
among Indian and Pakistani leaders to map the contours of their 
respective nations. The final determination thus reflected the political 
and personal imperatives of those who were intimately connected 
with its deliberation." 2 
Not surprisingly, the boundary awards, published two days after 
15 August 1947, failed to meet most expectations and unsettled the 
regional societies of Punjab and Bengal. Recent scholarship has begun 
to trace the impact of the border on the lives of those living in and 
around the border, and have questioned the claims of 'closed' national 
boundaries by focusing on the movement of border dwellers which 
continuously tested the irrevocability of political boundaries. The 
porosity of borders, especially the one in divided Bengal, meant that 
there was a gap between the rhetoric of border maintenance, of its 
absoluteness and success in excluding and including certain groups, 
and the reality of life at the border. Scholars such as Schendel and 
Baud have urged for a focus on the borderland as a unit of analysis 
rather than only the borders 3 An examination of borderlands as 
a site of interaction and negotiation between people from both 
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sides serves as an important corrective to the unchanging and linear 
representation of the border on maps. Further, the borderland defined 
itself as a vibrant site of economic activity even as the new nation 
states endeavoured to criminalize such activities. In divided Bengal, 
the border simultaneously evolved as a barrier to work and a site of 
new employment for state-appointed officials, militias, and armed 
fr . 54 forces who were called upon to guard the new national onuers. 
Borders generally define both the origin and the territorial limits 
of imagined national communities. After Partition, identities at the 
periphery had to simultaneously negotiate the emergence of the South 
Asian region as a 'unified' entitySS and the reflexive nationalisms that 
critically depended on each other for self-definition. In the case of the 
Bengal border, there was no clear correlation between territory and 
national identity. Identities were produced not so much by the physical 
location of the border but more due to India and Pakistan's attempt 
to control the movement of border crossers. This book focuses on 
the emergence of a document regime of passports, visas, migration 
certificates, and refugee slips which aimed to count and classify 
border crossers into different categories of belonging vis-a-vis the new 
nation states. Thus, border crossers now could be officially classified 
as temporary or permanent migrants, refugees, infiltrators, aliens, or as 
citizens depending on what kind of documentation they were able to 
obtain. Those who crossed without documentation faced the possibility 
of deportation but that happened rarely in the first few decades after 
the Partition. While the emergence of d0(ument-ary identity at the 
border was similar to processes in Europe after the First World War56 
where such documents were central to the emergence of citizenship, 
different conditions in Bengal entailed that these documents held a 
more utilitarian value to the border crossers even as India and Pakistan 
hoped to equate some of these documents with citizenship. 
In Bengal, there was no 'natural' succession of laws to control 
the border once the line had been drawn on the map. In contrast to 
the western boundary, Indian authorities in New Delhi and Calcutta 
did not view an 'open' Bengal border as a threat to India's security. 
The Bengal border thus evolved primarily as an economic frontier 
immediately after 194 7, and remained legally open until 1952 
when the continuous migration of East Bengali Hindu refugees who 
dem.anded the 'right' to rehabilitation from India led the Indian 
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government to take action to close the border in the east. The need 
to control this 'unending trail' ensured that by the mid-1950s, the 
border assumed territorial sanctity in official discourse and action. 
This book argues that the processes of delineating the political and 
territorial jurisdiction of the nation state enabled the emergence of 
national identity as the principal axis of state control over mobility 
and citizenship. 
SOURCES AND PARAMETERS 
'Destroyed by white ants and water'-this was one of the many similar 
descriptive entries in one of the catalogues at the State Archives in West 
Bengal. 57 Although only sixty years old, documents relating to the post-
Panition period in India and Bangladesh have remained inaccessible 
pa11ly because some files continue to be restricted to the researchers, 
panly because records were dispersed to different archives and libraries 
after 194 7, and pa11ly because of the deteriorating conditions in these 
archives which ensure that termites become responsible for destroying 
both papers and histories of three nations. Researching for this book 
took me to numerous archives across four countries in Bangladesh, 
India, the United Kingdom and the United States. Archival sources in 
Bangladesh and India are fragmented, eiTatic, kept in dilapidated archival 
storage in different cities, and sometimes in different locations of the 
same city. Representing the fractured beginnings of India and Pakistan, 
these sources primarily comprise 'official' voices: files containing memos, 
legislations, official directives of various ministries in India, East Pakistan, 
and Britain which kept up a healthy interest in its erstwhile Indian 
empire; local police records which noted movements and activities of 
'suspicious elements'; parliamentary debates recording differing opinions 
of legislators; and private papers of the principal political parties. 
But read closely, one finds that these official files contain 'unofficial' 
voices, of ordinary people who sent in letters, memoranda, and 
petitions to their official and political representatives demanding 
amelioration of their particular grievances within the context of 
becoming new citizens. These hithe110 ignored voices retlect and 
represent the experience of Panition as much as government records 
and high politics dictated its official trajectory. Although both official 
and unofficial records come with their attendant epistemological 
problems, I have attempted to read them 'against the grain', to 
20 Partitioned Lives · 
highlight the contingent conditions under which ordinary dtiz~ns of 
India and East Pakistan lived and experienced post-Partition projects 
of the two nations. In conjunction with personal .memoirs and oral 
nar.ratives that were recorded in the 1960~, such sources ·provide us 
with the mentalite of the post-Partition period. ·Further, when read as 
a dialogue between ordinary citizens and state policies, such sources 
provide insights into the nature and limits of state....-society relations 
in post-colonial South Asia. 
Newspaper reports and police records have been invaluable sources 
in piecing together the arc of India and Pakistan's official policies and 
public statements on various issues relating to border disputes, acts of 
violence, riots, and refugee relief. Further, newspapers also published 
letters from concerned individuals who used them as a public forum 
to raise· awareness and share opinion on specific · issues. Although 
such sources come with their own set of issues regarding veracity and 
were sometimes clearly embellished accounts1 i ha~e used them not 
for factual data but as re~ords indicating the multiple possibilities 
and contingencies that existed within the con~emporary public 'sphere. 
Given the constraints of the recorded sources this book draws on the 
border between West Bengal anp East Paki~tan . as representative. of 
border experiences between 1947 and 196s.ss · 
Further, it examines post-Partition legislations that did not always 
have a parallel correspondence in both India and East Pakistan. For 
example, the Evacuee Property Act was in operation in East Pakistan 
but India's Evacuee Property Act did not include areas in Bengal 
and Al?sam, primarily because the official expectation at the time of 
Partition was that there would be very little migration and hence no 
need for rehabilitation on the eastern side. 
Because Partition elicited a divided Pakistan, for the sake of this 
study, I have used 'East Paki~tan' to denote the geographical entity and 
used Pakistan and the Government of East Paldstan ·interchangeably to 
denote its official s(atur~. I have used the term 'East Bengal' to correctly 
denote the same region up until1956 when it officially became 'East 
Pakistan'. The Pakistan central government was located and concerned 
primarily with legislations and politics in West Pakistan and for most 
. . purposes; East Pakistan dealt with its inter dominion relations with 
India on its OWn. However, this is ''not to say that it had m,uch say or 
influence on'· how national Pakistani policy was framed. 
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The book is divided into three thematic sections, each containing 
two chapters. The first section focuses on the theme of territories-
both the delineation of a national border in Bengal and the diverse 
ways in which India and Pakistan sought to control movement across 
this border. On 3 June 1947, political leaders in India and Britain 
informed their citizens that India would gain independence by 1948 
and would also be partitioned into two nations, namely, India and 
Pakistan. Within days of this momentous announcement, the date 
of independence was brought forward to 14-15 August 1947. The 
blueprint for decolonization and independence required the setting 
up of a Boundary Commission to establish a new national border. 
Chapter 1 examines in detail the deliberations of both the officially 
constituted Boundary Commission and the public debates surrounding 
its inception. It contends that even though the logic of the Partition 
demand was predicated on religious demography, the public and 
political demands for territory had little to do with communal 
concerns. The new border drawn at independence failed miserably 
both at separating Hindus from Muslims and as a distinct marker of 
national jurisdiction. 
Although it was clearly defined on paper by August 1947, the border 
dividing Bengal took shape over the next two decades. Confusion 
about its location and its power to demarcate national sovereignty 
meant border conflicts over territory, livestock, and people; smuggled 
goods became a common feature of border life almost immediately. 
Simultaneously, India and Pakistan attempted to control refugee 
movements by requiring new documents such as passports, visas, and 
refugee slips as measures to classify and tabulate those who crossed 
the border. Chapter 2 explores the emergence and constitution of this 
document regime characterized by new forms of marking identity. Pieces 
of paper were the means of controlling and categorizing persons who 
legally wanted to cross the new international border. It was thus at the 
periphery that these nation states began to exercise their newly won 
sovereign powers, as they sought to decide who could and could not 
enter their territorial boundaries. 
The second section examines the processes of nation building in 
the aftermath of the Partition which engendered and crafted new forms 
of citizenship, new ways of belonging to the new nations. The post-
Partition period raised critical questions about national belonging: who 
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was an Indian and who was a Pakistani?; and on what basis were these 
questions to be resolved? Chapter 3 focuses on the Evacuee Property 
Act of 1951, promulgated in East Pakistan. It examines how the Act 
framed and complicated the ideas of citizenship amongst those who 
were primarily affected by its rulings, namely, the minority Hindus. 
The Act allowed the Pakistan state to requisition the property of those 
whom it viewed as potential evacuees to India. Further, by placing 
restrictions on items such as gold, foreign exchange. and even livestock. 
the Act redefined the very notion of property, and linked the rights of 
citizenship with property ownership and nationality. 
The act of migration, even if temporary, served to define one's 
nationality. It came to be seen as an indication of one's intent to 
acquire a new citizenship and to relinquish one's original identity. In 
this process, the same person could be designated an evacuee in one 
country and a refugee in another. Neither term guaranteed citizenship 
rights. Chapter 4 examines the Citizenship of India Bill, and the official 
and public debates surrounding it, in order to trace the development of 
the idea of legal citizenship in India. It argues that continued migration 
from the east (rather than the west) forced the architects of the Act to 
confront the modalities of defining a 'citizen' and to formulate rules 
that would directly impact the refugees from East Pakistan and aid in 
their transformation to Indians. 
The third section addresses the theme of identities, specifically 
those of minorities and refugees. Minorities in each nation faced 
questions about their supranational identities and had to justify their 
decision to remain in their ancestral localities. Religious identity 
collided with national identity, as minorities in India and Pakistan 
became trans-territorial citizens who resided in one nation but were 
alleged to profess loyalty to the other nation, the home of their 
religious brethren. Essentially, this was manifested through routine. 
small-scale violence that specifically targeted minorities in each 
country. Chapter 5 calls for a redefinition of the current paradigmatic 
vieW of Partition-generated violence as being large scale and primarily 
physical. Rather, in the case of divided Bengal, Partition violence 
was daily, small-scale, and often transmuted through psychological 
threats, both verbal and written. The routine of violence continued 
for two decades after 1947 and engendered migration across borders 
both to and from India. 
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Partition created another category of people: refugees or the 
displaced. In the case of Bengal, as Chapter 6 shows, the Indian 
State operated on the belief that migration from East Pakistan was 
unwarranted and temporary. Rehabilitation policies thus were ad 
hoc, limited, and had the expectation that refugees would be able to 
self-rehabilitate, albeit with the help of Indian State. In the light of 
policy failure, it was easy for the emergence of a paradoxical entity: 
the Bengali refugee, who was lazy yet pioneering, shorn of agency yet 
subversive, and who dung on to his 'refugee' identity yet demanded 
the rights of citizenship. 
The following chapters hope to present an analysis of how India 
and East Pakistan engaged with their post-Partition predicaments 
that had to square the needs of building distinctive nations and 
nationalities with the realities of lack of resources, imperfect and 
erratic legislations, and continuous movement of people and goods 
which tested the limits of each nation. Categorization of their people 
into citizens and foreigners was a necessary part of their nationalizing 
projects. It also hopes to present the story of how ordinary people on 
both sides of the Radcliffe line, such as Laila Ahmed, were impacted by 
such nationalizing projects and how they reacted, adopted, negotiated, 
and often ignored such classifications. Luckily for Laila, the Indian 
authorities allowed her to stay on with her parents on 'compassionate 
grounds' 59 until the Citizenship Act was passed and she could acquire 
Indian citizenship. 
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